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   NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
  
 No. 94-1801 
 ___________ 
 
 IN RE:  UNISYS CORP. RETIREE MEDICAL BENEFIT 
 "ERISA" LITIGATION 
 
  *Ralph Bieber and Donald J. Paquette, individually 
and on behalf of all members of the Unisys Class 
previously certified by the Court who were 
participants in the fall 1989 and fall 1991 early 
retirement incentive programs and their eligible 
spouses and dependents (referred to by the Court 
as "Unisys 1989 and 1991 VERIP Plaintiffs"), 
 
    Appellants 
 
  *(Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 12(a)) 
 ___________ 
  
 Appeal from the United States District Court  
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (District:  0313-2:  MDL 969) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Edward N. Cahn, Chief Judge 
 ___________ 
   
 Argued 
 May 4, 1995 
 Before:  MANSMANN, SCIRICA and McKEE, Circuit Judges. 
  
 (Filed    June 28, 1995)  
 ___________  
 
 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal is one of five before us arising from the 
termination of post-retirement medical plans offered to retirees 
and their spouses through Unisys Corporation and its corporate 
predecessors, Sperry Corporation and Burroughs Corporation.  This 
  
appeal focuses specifically on claims made by those who retired 
from Unisys pursuant to "voluntary early retirement incentive 
programs" offered in the fall of 1989 and the fall of 1991.1 
 In November, 1992, Unisys announced that effective 
December 31, 1992, it would terminate existing post-retirement 
medical plans funded through cost-sharing and replace them with a 
revised plan which would gradually shift the entire cost of 
medical coverage to the retirees.  A spate of lawsuits filed 
pursuant to ERISA followed.  Cases pending in several states were 
transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and three 
plaintiff classes were certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(2).   
 As members of one of the subclasses of Unisys early 
retirees, the Unisys VRIPs argued that in accepting an early 
retirement package, they had relinquished future income and 
accrual of pension benefits in return for attractive items in the 
VRIP package.  One of these items, they said, was the right to 
receive vested lifetime medical benefits.  Because the 1992 
termination of the post-retirement medical plan substantially 
affected the medical benefits under which they had retired, the 
VRIPs challenged the termination, alleging breach of fiduciary 
duty, equitable estoppel, and breach of contract. 
                     
1
.   Throughout the course of the litigation this class of 
retirees has been referred to as "VRIPs" of "VERIPs".  At the 
time of their retirement, the VRIPs were participants in the 
Unisys Post-Retirement and Disability Plan. 
  
 The breach of contract claim had two components.  The 
VRIPs argued first that the plan documents contained lifetime 
language and a reservation of rights clause, making the plan 
documents ambiguous.  The VRIPs contended that once this 
ambiguity was resolved through extrinsic evidence, it would be 
clear that there had been a promise of lifetime benefits and that 
this promise was inconsistent with the plan termination.  The 
second breach of contract theory advanced by the VRIPs was based 
upon an alleged bilateral contract created when the VRIPs 
accepted the terms of the early retirement offers.  The district 
court summarized this theory as follows: 
 [VRIPs] base their contract claim on a 
bilateral contract theory . . . that by 
signing up for the VERIP, they entered into 
separate bilateral contracts independent of 
the normal retiree benefit plans, and that 
this created a binding contract under which 
Unisys was not free to change the terms. 
 
1994 W.L. 284079, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 The VERIP claims, along with claims made by Sperry 
regular and incentive retirees and the Burroughs incentive 
retirees, were tried to the district court.  Ruling on the VRIP 
claims, the district court rejected each of the theories of 
liability and entered judgment for Unisys.  On July 11, 1994, the 
court entered a superseding order and final judgment which was 
certified for appeal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  It is 
from this order that the VRIPs appeal.  Because we conclude that 
the district court properly disposed of each of the VRIP claims, 
we will affirm the order of the district court. 
  
 I. 
 In this opinion, we confine our discussion to the 
VRIPs' bilateral contract theory.2  The VRIPs rest this claim on 
statements made in documents issued by Unisys in September, 1989 
and July, 1991, extending an early retirement option and 
explaining the terms of the early retirement offers.  The VRIPs 
argue that the terms of these solicitation documents obligate 
Unisys to continue the post-retirement medical benefits plan and 
to fund a percentage of the cost of these benefits.  Because the 
terms of the 1989 and 1991 early retirement offers differ, we 
highlight the relevant features of each before discussing the 
applicable law. 
 The 1989 Retirement Offer 
 On September 15, 1989, Unisys announced a voluntary 
retirement incentive program for eligible employees.  This 
program was detailed in a September 25th mailing.  One of the 
"two major elements" of the plan was described as: 
  a lifetime retirement enhancement that 
adds two years to your age and service 
for calculations of your benefits under 
                     
2
.   The law as it applies to the remaining VRIP claims 
based on breach of contract and equitable estoppel is fully 
explored in our opinion in appeal numbered 94-1800.  Because the 
law set forth there applies equally to the claims of the VRIPs, 
in affirming the order of the district court we adopt that 
analysis and do not reiterate it here.  With respect to the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim, the district court found that 
"the Unisys VERIP plaintiffs . . . did not present any evidence 
which suggested a breach of fiduciary duty. . . ." 1994 W.L. 
284079 at 33.  Having found no ground upon which to challenge 
this finding, we adopt the analysis of the district court; the 
VRIPs do not have a cognizable legal claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
  
the Unisys Pension Plan formula and your 
points in determining your contribution 
rates for the Unisys Post-Retirement and 
Extended Disability Medical Plan. 
 
The age and service enhancement was referred to elsewhere in the 
document as a "lifetime service-related benefit." 
 The VRIPs contend that the "lifetime" statements 
contained in the offering were made in conjunction with a 
separate announcement by Unisys that those retiring outside the 
time-frame of the offering would not be eligible to receive 
Unisys-subsidized medical coverage once they reached the age of 
65.  The VRIPs argue that the coupling of the early retirement 
offer with the announcement limiting medical benefits for other 
retirees led them to believe reasonably that they would have 
greater retirement security if they opted for the early 
retirement plan.  Use of the word "lifetime", they say, meant 
that they were entitled to expect to receive medical benefits 
indefinitely. 
 For purposes of evaluating the VRIPs' position, it is 
important to note that the offering document also contained a 
brief description of the Unisys Post-Retirement and Extended 
Disability Plan and charted the employee's monthly percentage 
costs.  The following language was included below the monthly 
cost table: 
 Unisys will attempt to maintain your 
contribution at the levels in effect during 
the year in which your participation begins.  
However, this cannot be guaranteed, given the 
unpredictable conditions that continue to 
influence post-retirement medical coverage, 
such as rising medical costs and legislative 
actions. 
  
 
 
 The 1991 Retirement Offer 
 
 In July, 1991, Unisys offered a second early retirement 
plan to employees retiring between July 25, 1991 and October 31, 
1991.  This plan did not feature enhanced medical benefits but 
did provide for certain incentive payments based on the 
employee's age and service.  It also contained a lump-sum payment 
option not offered to regular retirees.  Reference was made to 
the Unisys Post-Retirement and Extended Disability Plan and, as 
in the 1989 offer, a chart was included for purposes of 
calculating the employees' monthly percentage costs for medical 
coverage.  Unlike the 1989 offer, however, the 1991 document 
contained an explicit reservation of rights clause: 
 The Unisys Post-Retirement and Extended 
Disability Medical Plan provides the same 
coverages as the Unisys Medical Plan Option 2 
available through the Unisys Flexible 
Benefits Program.  Unisys cannot, however, 
guarantee that post-retirement medical 
coverage will not be changed in the future.  
The company continues to reserve the right to 
modify or terminate this coverage at any 
time. . . .  
 
 Although Unisys will attempt to maintain your 
contributions at the levels in effect during 
the year in which your participation begins, 
the Company cannot guarantee that the 
contribution levels will remain unchanged in 
the future.  The Company continues to reserve 
the right to increase contribution levels at 
any time. 
 
 The VRIPs argue that acceptance of this offer, too, 
created a contract obligating Unisys to continue providing 
subsidized medical coverage.  They attempt to avoid the 
  
reservation of rights language in the offer, arguing that Unisys 
did not reserve the right to modify or terminate benefits for 
those electing early retirement but intended that the clause 
apply only to employees choosing to retire at a later time.  The 
same logic is applied to the clause reserving the right to 
increase contribution levels. 
 
 II. 
 The sole issue we must address is whether the 1989 or 
1991 Unisys early retirement offers entitle the VRIPs to vested 
medical benefits.  We conclude that they do not.   
 In support of their position that the early retirement 
offers were sufficient to establish enforceable contracts for 
lifetime medical benefits despite restrictive language in the 
underlying benefits plans, the VRIPs cite one case in which a 
district court held that an independent bilateral contract claim 
may be cognizable under ERISA.  See Sprague v. General Motors 
Corp., 843 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1994).  Relying on Sprague, 
the VRIPs contend that statements made in the Unisys offers of 
early retirement were sufficient to create contracts, the terms 
of which were are variance with the underlying Unisys benefits 
plans.  We are convinced that Sprague is factually inapposite.  
We decline, therefore, to follow its reasoning.3 
                     
3
.   Because the Sprague facts are so dissimilar from those 
presented here, we do not reach the question of whether we could 
or would, under our own precedent, adopt the Sprague legal 
analysis in a factually similar case. 
  
 In Sprague, 84,000 General Motors retirees and their 
surviving spouses filed suit pursuant to ERISA in order to 
prevent the restructuring of medical benefits.  From this large 
pool of retirees, four classes were certified.  Two classes, 
early retirees who signed long-form or short-form documents 
accepting written offers of early retirement under incentive 
plans, are relevant here.  These early retirees claimed that GM, 
through a number of early retirement incentive plans, had offered 
them a "special deal" not available to others.  By the terms of 
this "deal", GM "agreed to continue health care benefits at no 
cost to them throughout their retirement at the same level they 
received before retirement."  943 F. Supp. at 269.  GM disputed 
this, contending that it had never intended to vest lifetime 
health benefits and, in fact, had promised early retirees nothing 
more than enhanced pension benefits. 
 Because the court determined that the documents 
evidencing acceptance of early retirement were facially 
ambiguous, additional evidence was introduced to establish the 
full scope of the early retirement package.  The GM early 
retirees relied "on information provided to them, both written 
and oral, at the time of retirement."  Id. at 270.   
 Sixty-four documents describing benefits available to 
early retirees were introduced into evidence as was testimony 
from human resources and supervisory personnel detailing 
communications to the early retirees concerning medical benefits.  
The court summarized this evidence as follows: 
  
 Although various formulations exist, 
virtually all of the benefit explanations 
provided to the early retirees by GM contain 
statements regarding both the duration of 
health care benefits ("for life," "during 
retirement," "continued after retirement," 
"lifetime," "will be continued," "for the 
rest of your lives"); and the cost of 
benefits ("no cost to retiree," "paid up," 
"at corporation expense," "without cost," 
"corporation paid basis," "at GM's expense," 
"paid for life by General Motors," "fully 
paid by GM"). 
 
843 F. Supp. at 317. 
 The court stressed that: 
 GM repeatedly used the lifetime language.  It 
appears in many of the benefit summaries 
relied on by plaintiff class, in addition to 
the SPDs.  In addition, GM supervisors and 
personnel representatives often assured 
potential retirees that health care would be 
provided for their lifetimes. 
 
Id.  The court concluded that the GM early retirees had reason to 
believe that they had been offered and had accepted a special 
package with features distinct from those available to regular 
retirees; it was reasonable for them to assume that limitations 
set forth in the regular benefits documents had no application to 
them.  GM's claim that the "lifetime" language used in the 
benefit summaries was of no legal consequence in light of 
disclaimers in actual plan documents failed due to overwhelming 
evidence of the employees' reasonable reliance on multiple 
contrary statements made by those with authority to bind GM. 
 The overwhelming evidence of use of "lifetime" language 
and the early retirees' reasonable reliance thereon is 
  
conspicuously absent in this case.4  Here, there is no suggestion 
in the offers of early retirement or in statements made to the 
VRIPs that Unisys undertook a contractual obligation separate 
from the underlying medical benefits plan available to all 
retirees.  Like the regular retirees, the VRIPs were entitled to 
receive benefits in accordance with the then-existing post-
retirement medical plan. 
 Most importantly, despite the VRIPs' creative argument 
to the contrary, it is also clear that both the 1989 and 1991 
offering documents "specifically alerted the [VRIP] participants 
. . . that the contribution rates were not guaranteed.5  The 1989 
offering stated that contribution rates "cannot be guaranteed."  
The 1991 offering is even more explicit in that it includes an 
unambiguous reservation of rights clause.  These disclaimers are 
sufficient to defeat the VRIPs' contention that they reasonably 
believed that their medical benefits were vested. 
                     
4
.   We recognize that the 1989 VRIP did contain the phrase 
"lifetime retirement enhancement."  The use of the word 
"lifetime" in this context is dramatically different from the 
assurances detailed in Sprague.  We cannot accept the VRIPs' 
argument that use of this phrase in the offering document was 
sufficient to allow them to conclude reasonably that medical 
benefits had vested.  See Chevrin v. Seelzer Bingham Pumps, Inc., 
1990 W.L. 303125 (D. Ore. 1990) (no ambiguity created where plan 
document used the term "Lifetime Maximum Benefit"). 
5
.   The district court, in an abundance of caution, went 
beyond the clear language in the offering documents to consider 
the reservation of rights clause set forth in the summary plan 
description.  We are convinced, however, that it is not necessary 
to look beyond the offering documents in order to reach a 
disposition with respect to the VRIPs' bilateral contract claim.  
The limitations contained in the offering are consistent with 
those in the underlying plan and create no ambiguity. 
  
 While we sympathize with the unfortunate position in 
which the VRIPs find themselves, we are not able to offer them 
legal redress.  We agree with the district court that "Unisys 
unambiguously reserved its right to increase contribution rates 
and/or terminate the medical plan", 1994 W.L. 284079 at 31 
(footnote omitted), and give weight to its finding that the VRIPs 
"presented no testimony from any VRIP participant who made a 
specific inquiry about the duration of his medical benefits and 
was given misleading, or false, information."  Id.  We conclude, 
therefore, that the VRIPs have failed to establish the existence 
of an enforceable bilateral contract. 
 
 III. 
 Having considered each of the VRIP claims of error and 
determining that the district court did not err, we will affirm 
the order of the district court. 
